We propose and apply several welfare measures that combine average income with a measure of inequality to undertake cross-country comparisons of aggregate welfare for the 1970 to 2000 period. Our welfare measures, which are based on theoretical and empirical findings on the role of inequality in social welfare, drastically change the impression of levels of welfare, significantly affect the welfare ranking of countries in different benchmark years, affect changes in ranking over time, and affect convergence between industrialized and developing countries. While the results are sensitive to the type of inequality and its presumed effect on welfare, the results are robust to different ways to address comparability problems inherent in the inequality data used.
Introduction
Despite its well-known short-comings, GNI per capita (and the associated per capita income growth rate) is still the most widely used indicator for comparisons of aggregate welfare across countries and over time. While many potential improvements to address these short-comings are either conceptually or empirically difficult or controversial, the complete neglect of the welfare implications of income inequality is an issue where there is broad and growing agreement in the theoretical, empirical, and experimental literature. Although there continue to be debates about the nature, type, and size of the well-being consequences of income inequality, a range of welfare measures combining incomes and their distribution have been proposed over the years that can accommodate these different views (e.g. Atkinson, 1970; Sen, 1976; Dagum, 1990) . In the past the application of those measures to welfare comparisons was limited, mainly because of lack of comparable data on income distribution, but also due to limited evidence on the size of the impact of inequality on welfare.
Recent years, however, have seen great advances being made in the generation of comparable data on income inequality across countries and across time (e.g. Deininger and Squire, 1996; Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; WIID, 2005) . Moreover, recent findings from the experimental literature as well as from the subjective well-being literature have solidified the empirical basis for including inequality in an assessment of welfare. The main contribution of this paper is therefore to apply aggregate welfare measures that are consistent with these findings on the role of inequality in affecting welfare to these newly available and more comparable data on inequality to make international welfare comparisons. In particular, we apply four welfare measures that combine mean incomes and income distribution (two of the Atkinson family and two measures using the Gini coefficient) to compare aggregate welfare across countries in the time period 1970-2000. In doing so we seek to answer the following questions. First, given the findings from the empirical and experimental literature on the relevance of inequality for welfare assessment, how do different ways of incorporating inequality in our assessment of welfare affect welfare levels and rankings of countries and regions? In particular, are there differences between welfare measures that are only affected by individual incomes and those that consider relative incomes and thus the income distribution itself? Second, how do these measures affect welfare rankings over time, including trends of convergence and divergence between rich and poor countries? Third, are these assessments of rankings robust given the existing problems of data quality and comparability with respect to inequality data?
The main findings of the paper are as follows. First, we find that plausible ways to incorporate inequality in welfare assessments that are consistent with the theoretical and empirical literature on the subject dramatically reduce levels of welfare in most countries. The size of the welfare penalty differs greatly between countries and regions and is also sensitive to the welfare measure used. Second, the ranking of countries at a point in time and over time is significantly affected in our inequality-adjusted measures and this result is robust to data and comparability problems of the inequality data used. Third, the frequency of rank changes of our welfare measures relative to per capita income rankings increases over time, particularly in richer countries which is partly due to an increasing divergence of inequality trends among rich countries. Lastly, findings on convergence between industrialized and developing countries are also affected by incorporating inequality in welfare measurement. In particular, the discrepancy of welfare levels between industrialized and developing countries is larger than when per capita incomes are used. Conversely, convergence of East Asia as well as divergence of Sub Saharan Africa appear larger in per capita incomes than in welfare terms.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section discusses previous work in this area and summarizes the conceptual approach as well as the aggregate welfare measures we use in the paper. Section 3 discusses the data and our manipulations for this analysis. Section 4 presents the results for the welfare analysis across space and time, section 5 the sensitivity analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 The role of income inequality in welfare measurement: Prior literature and proposed measures
While per-capita income ignores the distribution of income in an aggregate welfare assessment, 1 a range of approaches to the measurement of welfare, including utilitarianism assuming declining marginal utility of incomes, Sen's capability approach or Rawlsian reasoning would suggest that (income) inequality reduces aggregate welfare. These insights have been incorporated, for example, in Lambert's (1989) 'abbreviated social welfare functions' where aggregate welfare is an increasing function of mean incomes and a declining function of income inequality. The question then only arises what particular functional form such an abbreviated social welfare function should take, a subject we take up below and should also be guided by empirical evidence regarding the importance of certain types of inequality for aggregate well-being.
There have been a number of papers that have used versions of such abbreviated social welfare functions for cross-country and intertemporal welfare comparisons. The first paper applying such measures to international welfare comparisons is Kakwani (1981) . It considers the Sen measure we also use (see below) as well as a measure using a slightly milder form of a welfare penalty for inequality and additionally adjusts aggregate welfare levels for life expectancy shortfalls in a country (relative to 75 years). This is done for 62 countries using data from around 1970 and examines rank changes as well as betweencountry inequality using these different welfare measures (plus GDP per capita). Among the paper's findings are that country rankings are quite sensitive to incorporating inequality in welfare assessments and that between-country inequality in welfare terms is larger compared to between-country inequality in per capita incomes. Our paper differs from this interesting first study of international welfare comparisons by using a much larger, more reliable, and more comparable data set for incomes 2 but particularly for inequality, by considering changes in ranking over time, and by considering a broader range of welfare measures.
Two more recent studies have examined trends in inequality-adjusted aggregate welfare in the United Kingdom. Atkinson (1997) shows that, again using the Sen measure, aggregate welfare improvements in the UK in the 1980s were much smaller than growth of mean incomes. This issue is investigated in greater detail in Jenkins (1997) who studies changes in welfare in the UK between 1979 and 1990/91 using welfare measures based on Atkinson's inequality indicator for different degrees of inequality aversion as well as the Sen measure. Despite respectable growth in mean incomes, the generalized Lorenz curves for the income distribution in 1979 and 1990/91 cross and thus do not allow a unanimous social welfare ordering between the two years. Using the welfare measures, aggregate welfare fell during the Thatcher years only if relatively strong inequality aversion (ε = 2) is assumed. A study similar in spirit is Klasen (1994) who considers changes in welfare in the USA using, among others, the Sen and Dagum measures we use below for the years . It shows that, due to rising inequality, aggregate welfare fell in the 1980s using some of these measures, while improvements in aggregate welfare were much larger in the 1960s, compared to income growth rates. While these single-country studies are very much in the spirit of our investigation, we are interested here in international welfare comparisons and how they evolve over time.
Lastly, Gruen and Klasen (2003) considers the same measures used here to study intertemporal and global trends in welfare for the period 1960-1998. Due to rising inequality in most countries of the world since about the early 1980s, it finds that aggregate welfare improvements in these countries are overstated when per capita income growth rates are used which is then illustrated with a number of particularly stark case studies, including the USA, the UK, as well as transition countries.
3 In contrast, it finds that declining intercountry inequality in recent years suggests that global welfare has improved faster than global per capita income.
4 This paper differs by focusing on cross-country comparisons and how they have evolved over time and by using a more updated (and more reliable) data set on inequality.
In the spirit of this literature and Lambert's treatment of the issue, we start with an abbreviated social welfare function of the following form (Lambert, 1989) :
Welfare W is a function of mean income µ and a measure of inequality I. In fact, all of our measures are consistent with more structure on the function V and can be expressed as:
Several measures will be considered as they differ in to the intensity of welfare penalty as well as the type of inequality that attracts the largest penalty.
The first measure considered here was proposed by Sen (1976) and incorporates inequality by using the Gini coefficient G:
The Sen measure can be derived from a social welfare function assuming 'rank order weighting' where the weight of a person's income depends inversely on the rank in the income distribution (Sen, 1976) . It can also be derived from a utility function where individuals consider not only their own income, but the entire income distribution or, alternatively, their position in the income distribution (Dagum, 1990) . The measure also has a nice graphical illustration (Sen, 1997) , representing twice the area below the generalized Lorenz Curve.
A variant of this measure was proposed by Dagum (1990) :
Clearly, the Dagum measure is a more extreme version of the Sen measure as it results in a higher penalty for inequality. The Dagum measure is based on a social welfare function where individuals are negatively affected not only by overall income inequality but additionally by people ahead of them in the income distribution which may be the result of envy or asymmetric utility functions.
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In addition, two welfare measures based on Atkinson's well-known inequality index are used. The Atkinson inequality measures were developed as indicators of inequality that explicitly consider the welfare loss associated with inequality (Atkinson, 1970) . But one can equally well just use the way the welfare loss of inequality is calculated, the equally distributed equivalent income, as the welfare measure itself. This equally distributed equivalent income is the amount of income that, if distributed equally, would yield the same welfare as the actual mean income and its present (unequal) distribution. The general form of this measure is given in equation (4):
The measure depends crucially on the exponent ε, the aversion to inequality factor. The higher ε, the higher the penalty for inequality. Two cases are studied explicitly, ε = 2, denoted as A2, and ε = 1 (A1). In the latter case, the general form of the Atkinson measure is not defined and changes to:
The Atkinson measures can be derived from social welfare functions that are additively separable functions of individual incomes x i . Thus they are based on individualistic utility functions where people only care about their own incomes. Inequality reduces welfare in this formulation as the utility functions considered are concave for all ε > 0.
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Before turning to the data and the results, it is important to briefly discuss the most important differences between the two sets of measures.
7 Apart from the size of the penalty applied to inequality, the two Gini-based measures differ quite fundamentally from the two Atkinson measures. In the Gini-based measures, relative incomes and thus the shape of the income distribution itself have a separate and additional impact on well-being, over and above the effect the income distribution has on individual incomes.
On the other hand, the Atkinson measures have a number of desirable axiomatic properties, including subgroup consistency, transfer sensitivity (i.e. identical transfers have a larger impact on welfare when they take place at the lower end of the income distribution), and Pareto consistency (e.g. Atkinson, 1970; Sen, 1997; Blackorby and Donaldson, 1978) . The two Gini-based measures are not subgroup consistent, fail transfer sensitivity and fail Pareto consistency so that one could construct cases where increases in the incomes of the richest, ceteris paribus, reduces welfare. Transfers close to the mode of the distribution (which itself is close to the median in most empirical income distributions) have the largest effect on Gini coefficient so that the welfare penalty of inequality will be largest when middle income groups have particularly low income shares in the Gini-based measures, while using the Atkinson measures, the welfare penalty will be largest when the poorest have low income shares.
Which measures better capture the type and extent of welfare penalty that income inequality should attract is largely an empirical issue. Fortunately, a sizable literature in experimental economics and on subjective well-being has recently arrived at a number of interesting insights into this question. The most important findings from this literature are discussed in detail in (Klasen, 2006) . Two findings stand out, however. First, there is now overwhelming experimental and subjective well-being evidence that confirms the negative aggregate welfare implications of inequality (e.g. Okun, 1975; Amiel, Creedy, and Hurn, 1999; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Kroll and Davidovitz, 2003; Carlsson, Daruvala, and Johansson-Stenman, 2005; Johansson-Stenman, Carlsson, and Daruvala, 2002) . While individual studies differ, it is fair to say that the welfare 'penalty' of inequality implied by the measures used here is within the range of the findings from this literature. Second, most of these studies suggest that relative incomes matter a great deal in welfare measurement and therefore suggest that the shape of the income distribution itself has an impact on perceived aggregate welfare. This would favor the Gini-based measures that consider relative incomes explicitly over the axiomatically more elegant Atkinson measures (Amiel, Creedy, and Hurn, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Carlsson, Daruvala, and Johansson-Stenman, 2005; Schwarze and Härpfer, 2002; Alesina, Di Tella, 6 All the measures exhibit constant relative risk aversion. The ε = 1 has the additional property of being based on a constant elasticity utility function, suggesting that a percentage increase in income is valued the same regardless of its recipient. Such an assumption has quite a lot of intuitive appeal. While clearly ε = 2 penalizes inequality more than ε = 1 and is thus based on declining elasticity of income, the underlying assumption, that at twice the level of income, a percentage increase in income is valued half as much as at the lower level of income, also appears to be within the range of reasonable presumptions (see UNDP, 1990) .
7 For a more extensive discussion of these issues, refer to Atkinson (1970) , Blackorby and Donaldson (1978) , Sen (1997) and Dagum (1990) .
and MacCulloch, 2004; Clark and Oswald, 1995; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2003; Graham and Pettinato, 2002; Clark, 2003; Schwarze and Härpfer, 2002) . This should be borne in mind when interpreting the results below where Gini-based measures and Atkinson measures yield sometimes different results.
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The data
To calculate our measures, we need data on per capita incomes, Gini coefficients, and income shares (to approximate the distribution for the calculation of the Atkinson measures). Our source of data on inequality is the World Income Inequality Database version 2.0a (WIID, 2005) , which provides around 4,600 Gini coefficients and approximately 2,300 quintile or decile shares for 152 countries.
9 Each observation has been assigned a quality rating ranging from 1 (survey and income concept are known and ok) to 4 (so-called memorandum items and considered as unreliable).
Since we will adjust the inequality data to ensure comparability (see also below), we retrieve data from all four categories as long as they are representative of the entire population, are based on gross or disposable income, or on expenditures (or consumption), and on households or families as the income sharing unit.
10 With this selection, it turns out that almost 60 per cent of our data fall into the first two quality categories and only 3 per cent (all used for the first benchmark year 1970) belong to the least reliable category.
The data are assembled for 4 benchmark years (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000) . In cases where there is no data point for that particular benchmark year, the closest data point available was chosen. When several Gini coefficients with associated income shares were available for a particular country at a particular point in time, the observation consistent with the definition of previous or subsequent benchmark years was retained; the sensitivity of our results to this choice is examined below.
To ensure comparability, the inequality measure should ideally be based on a single definition of income and income sharing unit both across countries and time. Pursuing this strategy would result in only a small number of countries and not allow a meaningful international or intertemporal analysis. Following the standard in the literature (e.g. 8 Of course, there are other inequality measures one could also have used, including the Theil measure which is, similar to the Atkinson measures, sensitive to transfers at the bottom of the distribution, or the Coefficient of Variation (CV) which is particularly sensitive to transfers at the top of the distribution. While we prefer the Atkinson over the Theil measure (both which come from the class of generalized entropy measures) for its intuitive appeal, we do not use the CV as both theoretical and empirical contributions to welfare economics suggest that transfers at the bottom or the mode of the distribution should receive most weight in welfare assessments. We should also emphasize that we are trying to make static well-being comparisons for given levels of income and inequality. It may be the case that there are dynamic trade-offs (or conversely win-win situations) between the two phenomena so that in a dynamic setting one might prefer higher inequality if it delivered higher income in future. It appears, however, that the evidence for such trade-offs is rather weak while there is mounting evidence for lower initial inequality being associated with higher growth. For a discussion see, for example, Deininger and Squire (1998) , Forbes (2000) , Li, Squire, and Zou (1998) , Lundberg and Squire (2003) , Klasen (2004) .
9 The main sources used for assembling the data set were the Deininger-Squire data (Deininger and Squire, 1996) , the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS, 2000) , the TransMonee Project (TransMonee, 1999) as well as individual research studies and information provided by various Central Statistical Offices. 10 We include a few observations where the income sharing unit is unknown. Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Lundberg and Squire, 2003; Gruen and Klasen, 2001, 2003) , we therefore use a regression-based adjustment to the Gini coefficients and quintile shares to reduce the biases generated by different measurement concepts. We thus run a panel regression of all available Gini coefficients (or quintile shares) on the various measurement concepts (using country and period fixed effects). The regression results, based on about 2,200 Gini coefficients and 1,400 quintile shares, are shown in Tables 4 and 5 in the appendix and show expected results. For example, Gini coefficients based on expenditures or consumption are significantly lower than based on incomes, and those based on disposable incomes are also significantly lower than those based on gross incomes, particularly in OECD countries (see interaction term). We then use the appropriate regression coefficients to adjust all Gini coefficients (or quintile shares) that are not based on gross income per capita to that income concept to make them comparable across space and time.
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As far as mean income data are concerned, we rely on the purchasing power adjusted real GDP per capita provided by the Penn World Tables, version 6.1 (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2002) .
Welfare across space and time
To show the impact of our measures on levels and rankings of welfare across space and time, we proceed in four steps. First, we present welfare comparisons for regions for the year 2000 using the largest possible sample (101 countries). Second we build a consistent sample of 42 countries for which we have information for the four benchmark years and compare changes in levels and ranks of well-being between 1970 and 2000. Third, we consider welfare levels aggregated at regional level for 1970 to 2000, with a particular focus on inter-regional comparisons as well as comparisons with welfare in industrialized countries. Lastly, we show some pairwise country comparisons for 1970 -2000 to highlight particularly interesting individual results.
12 Table 1 shows the (population-weighted) mean incomes as well as the distributionadjusted welfare levels (both in levels and as a proportion of mean incomes, i.e. the ratio of equally distributed equivalent income to mean income) using our different measures by region in 2000.
Given the formulas above, the inequality-adjusted welfare measures are of course all smaller than mean incomes. The size of the 'penalty' for inequality ranges depends on the region and varies from some 20-35% when the Atkinson (ε = 1) measure is used up to 60-75% when the Dagum measure is used. Apart from this level impact of inequality on aggregate welfare, three findings are of particular note.
11 An example may be useful. Suppose an observed Gini for a country based on expenditure per capita is 50. To make it comparable to Ginis that are based on gross income per capita, we thus add 5.30 as our regression suggests that Ginis based on expenditures are systematically lower by 5.30 percentage points. Thus a comparable Gini equivalent to gross income per person would be 55.3. Please note that regarding the adjustment of quintile shares we run fixed effects panel regressions for the first four quintile shares and calculate the fifth one as a residual.
12 See appendix for comprehensive league tables and rankings of countries over time. Here we summarize the main findings.
First, aggregate welfare is affected most by inequality in Latin America & Caribbean, with distribution-adjusted levels of welfare reaching only 36% of per capita incomes when the Atkinson (ε = 2) is used and about 27% when the Dagum measure is used. The impact of inequality is second highest in Sub-Saharan Africa, followed by the Middle East & North Africa. In contrast, the aggregate welfare reduction are considerably lower and rather similar in East Asia & Pacific, South Asia, Eastern Europe & Central Asia (consisting of transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union), and high income countries.
Second, the nature of inequality appears to differ between regions. Latin America & Caribbean stands out as the region where the inequality adjusted aggregate welfare is particularly low when the Atkinson measures are used, where, for example, the ratio of inequality-adjusted income to per capita income using the Atkinson (ε = 2) measure is nearly 11 percentage points lower than in any other region, while the difference is smaller than six percentage points using the Dagum measure. Relative to other regions, the poor in Latin America appear to fare particularly badly in comparison to other income groups and since the Atkinson measures are particularly sensitive to the income shares of the poorest, we get these large reductions in welfare relative to per capita incomes.
Third, the discussion so far only focused on the relative role of inequality in aggregate welfare comparisons in different regions, but did not say anything about absolute welfare levels, for which we need to also consider the influence of mean incomes. To see that there are no unanimous answers about absolute welfare levels, Figure 1 shows Generalized Lorenz Curves for the five developing regions. While South Asia (SA) general Lorenz dominates Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and is dominated by the three other developing regions shown (confirmed by Table 1 which shows the same ordering of absolute welfare regardless of the welfare measure used), the Generalized Lorenz Curves intersect for the other three regions. Cumulative incomes of the poorest three quintiles are higher in East Asia and the Pacific (EA) than in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), while much higher incomes in the top two quintiles ensure that Latin America has the highest mean income, followed by the Middle East and East Asia. Given this and the fact that the Atkinson and the Gini-based measures give different weights to inequality in different parts of the distribution, it is not surprising that these two sets of measures tell a slightly different story as shown by the absolute values of the welfare measures in Table 1 . The Atkinson (ε = 2) measure suggests that East Asia has higher aggregate welfare than Latin America and the Middle East with the latter two having just about identical welfare levels, while the Sen and Dagum measures see Latin America ahead of the other two regions (although only slightly ahead of East Asia using the Dagum measure). The particularly low incomes of the poor lead to this weak performance of Latin America in the Atkinson (ε = 2) measure, while inequality around the mode of the distribution is more similar in the different regions. Depending on whether we are particularly concerned about the situation of the poor or are more guided by the findings from the literature on the importance of relative incomes, will thus lead to different assessments of the comparative welfare in these three regions.
Turning to comparisons over time, we rely on a consistent sample of 42 countries for which we are able to calculate all measures for the four benchmark years.
13 We first present 13 More information on the countries included is available in the appendix.
some aggregate evidence of rank changes and correlations, then consider the development of different regions, and finally present selected country cases. Table 2 shows rank changes using the four measures, all compared to the per capita income indicator. Rank changes depend not only on the impact of inequality on well-being but also on the size of the differences in per capita incomes; countries whose per capita incomes differ by little, will obviously more easily change ranks than those where the differences are larger. Bearing this in mind, a few interesting observations emerge.
First, regardless of the welfare measure used, the majority of countries experience rank changes compared to their rank in per capita incomes. Second, the rank changes are, not surprisingly, larger the higher the penalty for inequality, for both the Atkinson as well as the Gini-based measures in all four years. Third, closer inspection of the rank changes shows that, in general, large downward shifts are more common than large upward shifts. Among those countries with large downward shifts are consistently many Latin American countries, while a few East Asian and South Asian countries experience sizable upward shifts. In the later periods, there are also large rank changes among rich countries. Hong Kong and Australia are the two rich countries that experience very large downward rank changes while Belgium, Finland, and the Netherlands see large improvements. Fourth, large rank changes appear more frequently with the Atkinson (ε = 2) measure than the Dagum measure, suggesting that the differences in the income shares of the poorest differ more between countries than the income shares of middle income groups.
14 Lastly, there is a tendency for rank changes in our welfare measures, compared with per capita incomes rankings, to increase over time. As shown in Table 2 the number of countries with three or more rank changes is higher for all four measures in 2000 than in any of the three benchmark years before. The increase is particularly noteworthy for the Atkinson (ε = 2) measure where 22 countries experience a rank change of three or more, compared to only 11 in 1970 and 1980, and 14 in 1990 . Closer examination of the rank changes reveal that large rank changes have become more frequent over time in richer countries. If we only consider the richest 15 countries in the sample, the frequency of rank changes of three or more has risen from 1 in 1970, 4 in 1980, 6 in 1990 , to 9 in 2000. Two factors are responsible for this. First, convergence of income levels among rich countries have facilitated rank changes even without any changes in inequality levels and trends. But an inspection of correlation coefficients between per capita incomes as well as our four welfare measures shows progressively falling correlations for all four measures with per capita incomes between 1970 and 2000 confirming that the higher frequency of rank changes is not only due to changes in the income distance between countries.
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The second factor responsible for the increasing frequency of rank changes is therefore a growing divergence in inequality trends since the 1980s in rich countries. While inequality increased by significant amounts in the UK, the USA, Hong Kong, and Australia, it remained largely unchanged in the Netherlands, Finland, France, Italy, and Sweden over the same time period.
16 This increasingly affects rank changes in the inequality adjusted measures and it is therefore not surprising that those with rising inequality (such as Hong Kong or Australia) see larger declines in rankings over time in the inequality-adjusted measures while those with stable income inequality (such as Finland and Sweden) see larger improvements in rankings in these measures over time.
In explaining the overall rank changes and their trends over time, we have already highlighted particular country experiences. We want to deepen this discussion by examining welfare trends at the regional level and pick out particularly interesting pairwise country examples.
In Figure 2 we compare levels and trends in per capita incomes and our four aggregate welfare measures by region for 1970 to 2000.
17 We present this always as a proportion of the income and welfare levels of industrialized countries which thus allows us to say something about convergence of aggregate welfare between developing and industrialized countries. Several points are worth noting here.
First, when examining per capita income levels, we see that Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America diverged from the industrialized world, particularly since 1980, while we see substantial convergence (from a low level) in East Asia and slight catch up to industrialized countries in South Asia, beginning also in 1980.
Second, when turning to our inequality-adjusted welfare measures, the distance between industrialized countries and the developing regions is much larger in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Middle East (not shown) when inequality-adjusted measures are used while they remain roughly the same in South and East Asia. For example, per capita incomes in Latin America were at the 29th percentile of high income countries in 1970, but only at the 17th percentile when the Dagum or Atkinson (ε = 2) measure is used (i.e. a difference of 12 percentage points). A difference of 3-4 percentage points also exists in Sub Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa. Thus the findings of Kakwani (1981) which were based on rather patchy data from around 1970 that between country inequality in inequality-adjusted aggregate welfare measures is larger than in per capita incomes is replicated here with much better data for that year. As shown in the figure, it continues to hold in later decades as well.
Third, when examining trends over time, we see that the combination of higher growth since 1970 and lower inequality throughout ensures that East Asia surpasses the welfare levels of Latin America in 2000 when the Atkinson (ε = 2) and the Dagum measures are used. The comparison between South Asia and Sub Saharan Africa shows that South Asia surpasses Sub Saharan Africa in per capita income terms in 2000. Due to much lower inequality in South Asia throughout, however, it surpassed Sub Saharan Africa in welfare terms already in 1980 or 1990, depending on the measure and the gap has been widening since.
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17 The population-weighted consistent regional sample is slightly larger than the sample of 42 countries we just used as we are somewhat more flexible with the temporal matching of income and inequality data to make the sample larger and more representative. In a few cases (only in Africa and Latin America) we also interpolated inequality data when a data point was missing for a single benchmark year. For details of included countries, see appendix.
18 Per capita GDP and welfare levels in Sub Saharan Africa are highly sensitive to the inclusion of South Africa, by far the richest economy in Sub Saharan Africa, in the sample. Without South Africa, South Asia was already far richer in 1990. But this only affects levels of income and welfare, not the temporal trends.
Lastly, Figure 3 plots the change in percentiles of a region (relative to the level in industrialized countries) between 1970 and 2000 using the five different measures to examine whether changes different trends in inequality affect the divergence of convergence of regions to the industrialized world. As shown, there is clear evidence of convergence and divergence of different regions. Using our inequality-adjusted measures does not change the qualitative trends, but the quantitative magnitudes of convergence and divergence. In particular, in East Asia (and to a much smaller extent) South Asia, inequality rose faster than in industrialized countries, thus reducing the convergence to the rich world in inequality-adjusted welfare levels. In particular, East Asia gains about nine percentage points on rich countries in GDP/capita but only seven when the Atkinson (ε = 2) or Dagum measure is used. As the last set of bars shows, this is largely driven by China where sharply rising inequality there ensured convergence in inequality adjusted welfare was similarly smaller than in per capita incomes. Conversely, divergence of Sub-Saharan Africa and in Latin America between 1970 and 2000 is not quite as bad as suggested by GDP per capita, as in these regions inequality rose by less than in the industrialized world. As these regional trends, though instructive, are sometimes based on averaging opposing trends within a region, it is also useful to study individual countries to which we now turn.
In Figure 4 we track trends in well-being in Indonesia and Brazil between 1970 and 2000 where we express welfare in Indonesia as a percentage of Brazil's. In 1970 and 1980, per capita incomes were three times larger in Brazil, but inequality-adjusted welfare only about twice as large, showing the impact of Indonesia's lower inequality. By 2000, the situation is dramatically different. Due to higher income growth in Indonesia, Brazil is now less than twice as well-off in income terms. Once inequality is considered, falling inequality (from already much lower levels) ensures that Indonesia is now as well off as Brazil where inequality increased from already high levels. In fact, Indonesia is slightly ahead using the Atkinson (ε = 2) measure, and slightly behind Brazil using the Dagum measure, reflecting again differences in the type of inequality. In Figure 5 , we consider Canada's welfare levels as a proportion of those in the USA between 1970 and 1990. While the gap in per capita incomes favoring the USA is rising over time, in inequality-adjusted terms the situation looks very different. Here Canada is only slightly behind in the Ginibased measures with little change over time. In the Atkinson measures, Canada looks much better and improves its position considerably over time, particularly in the 1980s. Due to rising inequality in the USA in the 1980s, leading to particularly low income shares of the poorest quintile, Canada's welfare is nearly 20% higher in the Atkinson (ε = 2) measure, and about equal to the level in the USA when (ε = 1) is used. In Figure 6 , we consider Turkey in relation to Russia in 1990 and 2000 to see the impact of transition on relative welfare. In 1990, Turkey was about 40% poorer than Russia and due to its much higher inequality, aggregate welfare was about 60% lower in the inequality-adjusted measures. In 2000, the combination of falling incomes and sharply rising inequality in the transition process in Russia ensures that the income gap has shrunk to less than 20% and stays at about that level in inequality-adjusted welfare.
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Lastly, we compare China and India, the world's most populous countries that are often compared to each other and, in fact, often compare themselves (Sen, 2006) . In 1970 and 1980, India had higher per capita incomes but higher inequality there ensured that China 19 For a detailed discussion of the impact of transition on well-being, see Gruen and Klasen (2001, 2005) .
was ahead in the Dagum measure in 1970, and both Gini-based measures in 1980. As is well-known, in the late 1970s China embarked on market reforms that led to extremely rapid growth that has been sustained to this day. In India, growth also accelerated in the 1980s, but never reached China's rates. Conversely, China experienced a larger increase in inequality that accompanied this growth than India, so that inequality levels are now very similar. Thus by 1990, China has overtaken India in per capita incomes and remains ahead in Gini-based measures but rising inequality in China, due to particularly slower growth among China's poorest keeps India ahead when the Atkinson (ε = 2) measure is used. But continued much faster income growth in China and rising inequality in India in the 1990s ensures that by 2000 China is firmly ahead of India in all welfare measures.
Sensitivity analysis
Given the problems of quality and comparability of the inequality data used, the robustness of our findings is checked using two different approaches. First, we simultaneously replace Gini coefficients and quintile shares for all countries where we have two observations from the same year (usually either based on a different data source or a different income concept) and where the two data points differ considerably. In Table 11 in the appendix we show that these changes do affect rankings of individual countries where the differences in the observations were particularly sizable but they do not affect any of the qualitative findings presented in the last section.
Secondly, due to the concerns about the regression-based adjustment procedure for the Gini coefficients and income shares (e.g. Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001 ), we also reproduced all results using the unadjusted Gini coefficients. Also here, there are individual changes in rankings and also the relative position of regions is somewhat affected. For example, inequality-adjusted well-being in Latin America is now even worse due to the reliance on income surveys there, while in many other regions (particularly in Africa and Asia) expenditure surveys are used which as confirmed by our regression analysis, tend to report more equal incomes. Thus our findings about Latin America would be even more dramatic if we did not adjust for different income concepts. Also the failure to adjust for different measurement concepts leads to more noise in the data and thus somewhat more rank changes at any one time and over time. 20 We believe that this problem is a major argument for making such a regression-based adjustment although we agree that this adjustment is far from perfect and might not fully address the incomparability problems. But we are reassured that, when using these data, all the substantive findings of this paper are qualitatively the same.
Conclusion
Most theories of well-being as well as an overwhelming array of experimental and empirical literature imply a negative impact of inequality on aggregate welfare. Nevertheless, 20 See appendix Table 12 for more details. Using the unadjusted data leads particularly to larger rank changes using the Atkinson (ε = 2) measure. This is to be expected as income of the poorest quintile have a large impact on this measure and are quite sensitive to the measurement concept used. this insight is rarely used for international and intertemporal comparisons of welfare. In this paper we combine the insights from this literature with newly available internationally comparable data of per capita income and its distribution to demonstrate the impact of considering inequality in international and intertemporal welfare assessments. The impression of aggregate welfare derived from inequality-adjusted measures drastically differs from the one obtained when looking at the mean incomes alone. We want to highlight five findings in particular.
First, using plausible adjustments for inequality that are consistent with the literature on risk, inequality aversion and subjective well-being, our measures show, compared to per capita incomes, dramatically reduced levels of welfare where the type of inequality has a significant impact on the welfare reduction implied by it. This is reflected by the differences in our results using the Atkinson versus the Gini-based measures. In particular, the conceptually and axiomatically more elegant Atkinson measures suggest particularly low welfare levels in Latin America, particularly when compared to industrialized and transition countries, while the empirically more plausible Gini-based measures show significantly smaller differences. Second, the ranking of countries is significantly affected by inequality-adjustments. While it particularly affected the ranks of middle income countries, more recently it has had a very large impact on the ranks of industrialized countries. Third, rank changes using our welfare measures (compared to per capita income ranks) have increased over time, particularly due to divergence in inequality trends in rich countries. Fourth, gaps between industrialized and developing countries are typically much larger using our inequality-adjusted measures, while convergence of East and South Asia (and divergence in Latin America and Sub Saharan Africa) is smaller in welfare than in per capita terms. Lastly, the pairwise country comparisons show even stronger impacts of the impact of diverging inequality on aggregate welfare. Of particular note is that rising inequality in the USA, Brazil, Russia, and China have negatively affected their welfare rankings over time.
Clearly, inequality matters for welfare comparisons and we hope that this empirical assessment will contribute to further debates and research about the measurement and interpretation of inequality, the causes of inequality trends, and its relationship to policy and other economic developments. (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2002) . Columns 2-5 show the average ratio (absolute value) of the respective adjusted income to unadjusted GDP per capita per region in %. For individual countries, see Table 6 . Note: China's welfare measures are expressed in relation to the respective welfare measures of India. Notes: All rankings are based on the absolute values of the well-being indicator. The last four columns present the ratios of the respective adjusted income to unadjusted GDP per capita, PPP. continued on next page 
Appendix
